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Vt. 162; Hunt v. Hoover, 24 Iowa 231; Nash v. Lull, 102 Mass.
60. We have been referred to the case of -Elmer v. Pennel, 40
Me. 430, as sustaining the view of appellant and as asserting the
want of jurisdiction of state courts even although the validity of a
patent arises collaterally. The opinion in that case was not concurred in by APPLETON, C. J., and in the case of Nash v. Lull,
supra, it is said of it that it was inconsistent with the authorities
upon that subject. We think it, therefore, clear that the trial
court had jurisdiction in this case to pass on the validity of the
patent, and that it was justified in predicating the invalidity of the
patent on the facts Stated in the various instructions. That it was
so justified is abundantly shown by the following cases, into an
analysis of which we deem it unnecessary to enter: Darst v. Brockway, 11 Ohio 462; McG-lure v. Jeffrey, 8 Ind. 79; Cross v.
Huntley, 13 Wend. 385 ; Head v. Stevens, 19 Id. 411 ; Hotchkiss
v. Greenwood, 4 McLean 456; 1 Mass. 447,473; Rowe v. Blanchard, 18 Wis. 441; Curtis's Law of Patents, §§ 253, 256.
The last of the authorities referred to justified the court in giving the second instruction complained of.
Judgment affirmed.
ROUGH,

J., having been of counsel, did not sit.
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except and reserve from an assignment for the benefit of creditors, pro.
perty to the value of $300, is undoubted. He cannot do so, however,
out of land, to the injury of one holding a lien for the purchase-money,
or a judgment lien in which the exemption from execution is waived.
His claim must be restricted to some property which he owned, or in
which he had an interest at the time of the assignment, or at the
furthest, to the proceeds of that property sold. It cannot extend to
money made by the assignor's care, management and use of the assigned
property: Bausman's and Herr's Appeal, 90 Penn. St.
Assignees received rent for the use of a farm, after an assignment,
not on a term existing at the time of the assignment, but on a letting
afterwards. They also sold the land, but the sum realized therefrom
was insufficient to pay the judgment liens for purchase-money. There
was a reservation of the $300 exemption in the assignment. The
assignor claimed it out of the rents. Held, that the craim could not
be allowed: Id.
BANK.

NationalBank- Guaranteeof Note-Act of Congress- Construction
of-Authority of Ojffcer-Estoppel.-Underthe National Banking Act
(Rev. Stat, sect. 5136), a national bank may guarantee the payment of
a promissory note transferred by it: Peoples' Bank of Belleville v.
Manufacturers' Nat. Bank of Chicago, S. 0. U. S, Oct. Term 1879.
Where such guarantee is signed by the vice-president, with the
knowledge and consent of the president and cashier, the bank is estopped from denying the authority of the vice-president to give the
guarantee: Id.
BANKRUPTCY.

Assignee-Motion to be made Party to Suit- When denied-Estop.
pe.-When an assignee in bankruptcy stands by, while the bankrupt
prosecutes to final appeal to the Supreme Court, a claim against the
government, for the benefit of certain creditors, to whom he had conveyed the claim as collateral, the latter court will not, upon the assignee's motion to be made a party, decide his rights as against such creditors, by giving him control of the suit: United States v. Peck, S. C. U.
S., Oct. Term 1879.
BILL op SALE.

Consolidationof Mortgage with-Execution Credtor-Rght to Surplus Proceeds of Goods, after dischargingBill of Sale -The doctrine
of consolidation of mortgages does not enable the grantee, by a registered bill of sale of goods seized under aft. fa., to tack a prior mortgage of other property of the grantor, and claim that the surplus proceeds of the goods, after discharging the sum secured by the bill of
sale, shall be applied in satisfaction of the prior mortgage, so as to
defeat the right of the execution creditor to such surplus: Chesworth
v. Hunt, Law Rep. 5 C. P. Div.
BILLS AND NOTES.

See Lunatic; Mortgage; Partnership.

Duress of Maker-Right of Endorser to prore.-Where a promissory
note was obtained by duress of the maker, and endorsed in good faith,
without any knowledge of the duress on the part of the endorser, in a
suit by the payee, who was guilty of the duress, against the endorser,
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the latter may set up the duress of the maker, as a defence to .he
action: G rfflth et al. v. Sitgreaves, 90 Penn. St.
Accommodation Note-Admissibility of Evidence to show Agreement
that Endorser should incurno liability-Evienceof surroundingcircumstances.-In an action by the holder against the endorser of a check,
the defendant alleged that he permitted the use of his name as payee,
and endorsed the check at the request of and as a matter of accommodation to the plaintiff, not only without consideration, but upon the
express promise and agreement that he should incur no liability by reason of his endorsement, Reld, that it was competent, as between the
immediate parties to the transaction, to prove these allegations: Breneman v. Furniss, 90 Penn. St.
The defendant offered to prove the facts above stated, together with
circumstances connected therewith, as explanatory of the transaction.
The court permitted him to prove the naked fact that the "check was
given with the understanding that he should incur no liability thereon,"
but studiously excluded all testimony, tending to show the circumstances under which he permitted the use of his name as payee, and
became endorser of the check, or the purpose for which it was done.
Rdd, that this was error: Id.
COMMON CARRIER.

See Railroad.

Goods destroyed by .Fre.- When Carrier ceases to be bable as such
and becomes a Warehouseman.-A package of goods was delivered to
the Great Western Railway Company, and another to the London and
North Western Railway Company, for carriage to the station of the
former company at W., both packages being addressed to the plaintiff
"to be left till called fbr." One of the packages arrived at W. on the
24th of March, the other on the 25th. On their arrival they were
placed in the station warehouse to await their being called for. The
defendants did not know the address of the plaintiff, vjio travelled about
the country with drapery goods. The goods had nor been called for,
when, on the morning of the 27th of March, a fire having accidentally
broken out, the warehouse was burned down and the goods were consumed by fire. The plaintiff on the same day after the fire called for
the goods, and-; not receiving them, brought actions against the defendant
companies, as common carriers, to recover their value. Reld, that after
the interval of time which the plaintiff had suffered to elapse since the
arrival of the goods, the liability of the defendants as common carriers
in respect of the goods had ceased, and they had become mere warehousemen of them, and, consequently, that the actions were not maintainable in the absence of any evidence of negligence on the part of the
defendants: Chapman v. Great Western Railway Co., Law Rep., 5 Q.
B. Div.
CONFLICT OF LAws. See Insurance.
CONSTITUTIONAL JAW.
of-Exemptionfrom Taxation- Charter-ResConstruction
Statuteervation of Power to alter-Effect of.-Exemptions from taxation will
not be enforced unless granted for a valuable consideration and expressed
in clear and unambiguous terms: Union Passenger Railway Co. v.
Philadelphia,S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
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The right of a state to impose a future tax cannot be taken away by
implication arising from a direction to pay a certain sum: Id.
Where a constitutional amendment reserves to the legislature the
right to alter charters, a subsequent act of incorporation must be construed as if the amendment was embodied in it: Id.
Such reserved power to alter charters cannot be used to impair vested
rights, but may be ekercised to almost any extent to carry into effect the
original purposes of the grant, and to protect the rights of the public
and of the corporators : Id
An amendment to a state constitution reserved to the legislature the
right to alter charters. Subsequently a street railway company was
incorporated, its charter providing that it should pay to a city "such
license-fee for each car * * * as is now paid by other passenger railway
companies." At this time the annual license-fee fixed by the city
ordinances was $30 per car. Afterwards the legislature enacted that all
the railway companies in the city should pay a license-fee of $50 per
car. Reld, that the railway company was bound to pay the increased
license-fee: .d.
Power of Legislature to relieve Property from Illegal TaxtionSpecial Legislation.-Where a municipal corporation, in exercising
the power of assessment to pay for a public improvement, levies the
assessment upon property which was not subject to be charged therewith, and, in a suit brought to enforce the assessment, the property thus
charged was ordered to be sold to pay the same, it is competent for the
legislature to relieve the property thus ordered to be sold, and to require
the amount improperly charged thereon to be paid out of the funds of
the corporation : State v. Hoffman, 35 Ohio St.
Where the statute granting such relief does not confer corporate
power, it may be a special act: Id.
CORPORATION.

See ConstitutionalLaw; Taxation.

Insolvency-Right of Officers, who are also Creditors,to execute Notes
to themselves-Attempt to obtain Preference.-An insolvent corporation
being indebted to its officers and directors, they executed the notes of
the corporation in their own favor, and having obtained judgment by
default, issued execution thereon. In the distribution of the proceeds
of the sheriff's sale of the personal property of the corporation, Held,
that this conduct of the officers was a fraud in law, which gave them no
preference over general creditors in the distribution: Hopkins's and
Johnson's Appeal, 90 Penn St.
Transfer of Stock-Loss of Certificates-Issueof New CertificatesLiability of the Company-Dividends-Statute of Li'hitations.-Onthe
9th of September 1854, the Cleveland and Mahoning Railroad Company
issued to V. certificates of its capital stock, which declared upon their
face that the stock was transferable on the books of the company upon
the surrender of the certificates. On the 16th of September 1854, the
stock was sold to F. by V., who delivered to him the certificates, with
blank powers of attorney to enable him to have the stock transferred.
The certificates were mislaid by F., and were not discovered until
December 1871. In the meantime, on May 8th 1863, the board of
directors of the railroad company, on the application of V., issued to
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B. & P., to whom V. assumed to sell the stock, new certificates of stock,
on the supposition that the original certificates had been lost by V. On
the application of the administrators of F. for a transfer of the stock
to their names, and for an account of the dividends, the company
refused the application, on the ground of the issue of the new certificates
to B. & P. The by-laws provided that no new certificates should be
issued until the previous certificate was surrendered and cancelled; and
also that certificates might be issued on the special order of the board
of directors, in the place of lost certificates, on proof of such loss, and
on indemnity to the company. Beld, that the issuing of the new certificates to B. & P., and the allowing the transfer of the stock to them,
was a breach of the duty which the company owed to F., and created a
liability on the company to replace the stock to which F. was entitled,
or to account for its value. Held, further, that the company was not
liable for the dividends paid on the stock, before it had notice of the
transfer of the certificates to F. Held,further, that until the transfer
of the stock to the holders of the original certificate was refused, or
they had notice of the transfer of the stock to other parties, the Statute
of Limitations did not begin to run: Cleveland and MJdhoning Railroad
Co. v. Robbins, 35 Ohio St.
CRIMINAL. LAW. See Husband and Wife
Motion for New Trial--Right of Accused to hearing before the Judge
who tried the Cause.-A person accused of crime, after verdict against
him, has a right to the solemn opinion of the judge before whom the
cause was tried, after a careful hearing of all that may be alleged
against the justice of the verdict, that it ought to stand : Ohms v. The
State, 49 Wis.
Where, therefore, the evidence upon which a verdict of guilty of
murder in the first degree was found, was not overwhelming, and the
accused was unable to obtain a proper hearing of his motion for a new
trial, because it was inconvenient for the trial judge (who sat in place
of the judge of the circuit in which the trial was had) to remain and
bear the dame, and such judge erroneously supposed that the motion
might properly be heard by the judge of the circuit, this court reverses
the judgment, and orders a new trial, without determining whether the
verdict was agaist the weight of evidence, or whether there was error
in the instructions given to the jury: I .

Tury-Return to Court for Instructions as to Evidence.-The jurors
in a criminal case, after retiring to consider their verdict, returned
into court and requested the judge to state his recollection of the evidence of a witness who had given material testimony on the trial. Held,
that to comply with the request is not error: Bzdse v. The State, 35
Ohio St.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Transfer of Debtor's whole Property- When Valid.-If a creditor,
knowing that his debtor is in failing circumstances, takes a transfer of
such debtor's whole property, with an honest design to secure the payment of the debt due himself, and without any intent to defraud other
creditors, the transfer is valid as against them : Gage v. Chesebro, 49
Wis.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
DEED.

Acknowledgment of Payment of Purchase-money- Whenprimafacie
Enidence-S .inff's Deed.-A deed executed to a purchaser
of
sold under an execution, by the sheriff, under an order of the lands
court,
after confirmation of the sale, in which the payment of the purchasemoney is acknowledged, is primafacie evidence of such payment;
but
a deed containing a like acknowledgment by the grantor, at a
private
sale, is no evidence of such payment as against a prior, unrecorded
deed : Morris v. Daniels, 35 Ohio St.
DURESS.

See Bdils and Notes.

ERRORS AND APPEALS.

See Trial.
Evidence-Presumption in favor of Charge-Ncessity of Prayer
for Instructions- When Answer to Question must be shown.-When
the
correctness of the charge depends upon evidence, not shown
by the
record, the presumption is that the evidence sustains the charge:
Lovell
v. Davis, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
Where a party is not satisfied with a mere statement in the charge,
of the general rule of law, he should ask for more definite
instructions: Id.
Where a question is objected to, it is the evidence and not the
tion which constitutes the error, and if the answer is not shown quesby the
record the Appellate Court will not reverse : Id.

ESTOPPEL. See Banks; Bankruptcy.
Receipt in full upon Decision of lower Cburt-ubsequent Reversal
increasing Amount due.-After a determination by judgment
of the
Circuit Court, of the several amounts to which plaintiffs were
entitled
as legatees, they received those amounts and gave receipts in full.
Afterwards they appealed from the judgment, which was reversed here,
and
a construction given to the will by which they were entitled to
larger
amounts. Held, that the receipts were not conclusive of their
rights:
Catlin v. Wheeler's Ez'r, 49 Wis.
EVIDENCE.

See Bills and Notes; 'Deed; Lunatic.

FiXTURES.

See Landlord and Tenant.

GUARANTEE.

See BANK.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Clothing of Wife-When Property of Husband-Indictment
Larceny of- Value.-Necessary and suitable clothing furnished for
by a
husband to his wife, or purchased by her with money or means
given
to her by her husband, for that purpose, does not become her separate
property, within the meaning of the Ohio statute, concerning
the
rights and liabilities of married women: Pratt v. State of
Ohio, 35
Ohio St.
But articles of personal clothing, purchased by a wife with her
separate money or means, are made her separate property by the
Act of
March 30th 1871 (68 Ohio L. 48); and a conviction for the
larceny
Voa. XXV111-84
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of such goods, under an indictment laying the property in the husband
cannot be sustained : Id.
In proving the value of personal clothing, on a trial for the larceny
thereof, the testimony should not be confined to current prices among
dealers in second-hand clothing: Id.
Where the separate property of a wife has been stolen from the
family residence, such fact alone will not authorize a conviction under
an indictment laying the property in the husband : Id.
INJUNCTION.
INSURANCE.

See Tax; Taxation.
See Pleading; Shipping.

Ship-Loss by Perils of the Sea-Payment in respect of Bottomry
Bond-ForeignLaw how far applicable to English Policy.-A policy
of marine insurance was effected with English underwriters, by an English merchant, upon goods shipped in a French ship. and it was thereby
provided, that general average was to be payable, as per judicial foreign
statement. The ship was damaged by a collision and put into port for
repairs, the cargo, however, being uninjured. The master, not having
funds to do the necessary repairs, gave a bottomry-bond, on ship, freight
and cargo. The ship and freight proving insufficient to satisfy the
bond, the assured had to pay the deficiency, in order to obtain possession of his goods. Held, that the policy was not to be construed according to French law, except so far as the parties had expressly stipulated that it should be, and that there being no loss by perils of the
sea, according to English law, the assured could not recover from the
underwriters the amount which he had paid as above mentioned: Greer
v. Poole, Law Rep., 5 Q. B. Div.
Agreement of Compromse-Subsequent D~iscovery of Breach of Conditions.-Where, after a loss by fire of insured property, and after an
opportunity to investigate it, the insurer, without any deception or fraud
practised upon it by the insured at the time of such investigation,
agrees with the insured that it shall pay and be receive a certain sum
in full, on account of such loss, a recovery of that sum cannot be
defeated, by showing a breach of a warranty in the policy, though
unknown to the insurer at the time of such agreement: Stache v. The
St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 49 Wis.
Provision against Assignment-Assignment after Loss.-A provision
in an insurance policy, avoiding it in case of its assignment without
the consent of the company, applies only to an assignment made before
a loss under the policy: .Dogge v. Northwestern National ns. Co., 49
Wis.
JOINDER OF ACTIONS.

See Parties.

LAND.

Sale by Government-Effect of-Subseluent Patent to adverse Cilaimant- Validity of.-Where the right to a patent has become vested in
a purchaser of public lands, it is equivalent, so far as the government
is concerned, to a patent actually issued, and a subsequent patent to
another person would be void so long as the first sale remained in force Simmons v. Wagner, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

667

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Lease - Covenants- Uiter-lease-Fxtures.-An under-lease
nursery-ground contained an express covenant by the under-lessee,of a
to
deliver up all landlord's fixtures thereon at the end of the term.
field
that a representation and covenant by the grantors of the
under-lease,
that the under-lessee should be at liberty, without hindrance
from any
one, to remove trade fixtures during the term, and that
the grantors
had not entered into covenants inconsistent with such right,
could not
be implied: Porter v. Drew, Law Rep., 5 C. P. Div.
LARCENY.

See Husband and Wife.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

See Corporation.
Mutual Account-Application of Payments.-An account
running
through more than six years, included items for services and
materials
of various kinds furnished by plaintiff, as required for defendant's
use,
and items of lumber, &e., furnished by defendant to plaintiff,
one instance, a buggy, carriage and sum of money taken from and in
defendant in exchange for another carriage. Reld, that this was
an open,
mutual account, and the Statute of Limitations did not commence
run until the date of the last item charged : fannan v. Engelmann, to
49
Wis.
Payments on account, not applied by either party at the time,
will be
applied by the court as equity may require; and in case
of an open,
running account, would be applied to the earlier items,
if that were
necessary, to prevent the running of the statute : Id.
Lis PENDENS.

See LUNATIC.

LUNATIC.

Promissory_Note-Purchaserfor Talue-Inguryinto Consideration
-Evidnce-Lis Pendens.-The principle that the consideration
of a
negotiable note cannot be inquired into in the case of a
holder for
value, does not apply to the case of such paper made by
a lunatic:
Moore v. Hershey, 90 Penn. St.
In a suit by the endorsee of a promissory note made by
the latter or his committee may defend, on the ground that thea lunatic,
endorser
had knowledge of the maker's lunacy, or that the note was
obtained by
fraud or without proper consideration : Id.
Where the endorsee of a promissory note has been notified
that he
will be required to prove the consideration, paid by him for
and he takes the stand to prove that he is a bonafide holder, the note,
it is proper
on cross-examination, to ask such questions as will tend
to discover
whether the endorsee knew that the note was originally obtained
without proper consideration : Id.
The defendant lunatic may also prove that he received no
tion for the note ; that it was given pending proceedings in consideralunacy, and
that plaintiff admitted that defendant had not received value
for the
note: Id.
Per PAXSON, J.-A lis pendens is undoubtedly constructive
notice
in questions of title and property, but that it should be so as
to a man's
mental condition is much to be doubted : Id.
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MECHANICS' LIEN.

Architect- When not entitled to Lien.-An architect who simply
provided the plans and specifications for a building, is not entitled to a
lien against said building for his labor. Bank v. Gries, 11 Casey 423,
distinguished: Pricev. Kirk, 90 Penn. St.
Lien on Improvements-Descriptionof Properfy-PersonalJudgment
-Amendment.-When a special security and remedy are given to a
favored class of creditors, they must conform with reasonable accuracy
to the provisions of the law designed for their benefit: Ely v. Wren,
90 Penn. St.
Where a claim is filed, under the provisions of the Act of February
17th 1858, extending the Mcchanics' Lien Law in certain counties to
certain improvements, engines, &c., put up by tenants of leased estates
on lands of others, the property against which the lien is given must
be so accurately described, that when judgment is obtained on the
scirefaciasa separate schedule will not be required to be annexed to
the levarifaciasfor the guidance of the sheriff: Id.
It seems, that it was informal to enter judgment against the defendants personally in such a proceeding: but if there was no other difficulty in the way, this might be treated as amended- Id.
St. M~ir Coal Co. v. Martz, 25 P. F. Smith 384, followed: Id.
MORTGAGE.

See Bill of Sale.

Agreement to extend Time--Effect of-Where, by the original condition in a mortgage, the debt secured by it was payable sixty days after
demand, a new agreement extending the time of payment to a day certain, when binding, has the effect in equity, of modifying the original
condition of the mortgage to the same extent as if the terms of the
new agreement were incorporated into the condition: Uion Central
Life Ins. Co. v. Bonnell, 35 Ohio St.
Given to secure Promissory Note- When demand of Payment unnecessary.-In the condition of a mortgage, given to secure the payment of a
promissory note, payable on demand, it was provided that, if the mortsaid note, or cause the same to be paid, the mortgagegagor shouldbepay
void. Beld, that demand of payment of the note, before
deed should
suit, was not a necessary condition to a right of action on the mortgage:
Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Curtis, 35 Ohio St.
Date-Not conclusive-ParolEvidence to show time of ExecutionEffect of Recording-Notice to Purchaser.-As to time, the date of a
mortgage, as it appears on the registry of the mortgage, is not to be conclusively taken to be the date or time of its execution, and parol evidence is admissible to show, that in point of fact, it was subsequently
executed and delivered: Parkev. Neeley, 90 Penn. St.
As a general rule, a purchaser is not bound to look beyond a judgment-docket, for liens that should there appear. It is different, however,
with the registry of deeds and mortgages. The chief object of recording
them is to give actual as well as constructive notice to everybody of title
and encumbrances thereon; and -apart from notice, the only effect given
to recorded instruments by the statute, is to make certified copies
thereof evidence; and in case of mortgages, to provide that they shall
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not be liens, until left for record, except mortgages for purchase-money,
which continue to be liens from the date of their execution, if recorded
within sixty days thereafter: d.
A mortgage, on its face, showed that it was taken to secure purchasemoney of the land therein described. It was not recorded until sixtytwo days had elapsed from its execution and delivery. It appeared
further, that it was not acknowledged until two days before the date of
recording. There were other facts relating to the acknowledgment,
from which it would be naturally inferred that the acknowledgment was
on the same date as the execution and delivery. Held, that these circumstances, all of which appeared on the face of the papers, were
sufficient to rebut the inference, which would otherwise have arisen
from their dates, and were quite sufficient to put the purchaser at a
sheriff's sale upon inquiry, and visit him with notice. Beld,further,
that there was no error in admitting parol evidence to prove the actual
date of delivery : Id.
MUNICIPAL BONDS.

In aid of Railroad- Survey- Change of Route-Recital-Estcppel.-A statute authorized townships along the route, or at the termini
of a certain railroad to issue bonds in aid of its construction. A township, which was at one of the intended termini of the road, issued bonds
before the route had been actually surveyed. Subsequently, under an
amendment to its charter authorizing an extension, the road changed its
lans and surveyed a route through instead of to the township. The
onds on their face recited that they were issued in pursuance of the
original statute. Held, that the bonds were properly issued: Held.
further, that as against a bona fide holder the township would be
estopped, from denying the recital: Township of Pompton, &c., v.
Cooper Union, &c., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879
NEGLIGENCE.

See Railroad.

Railroad-lPresumplionof Neyligence- When not raised.-While it
is the duty of a railroad company to provide safe and convenient means
of ingress and egress to and from the cars, it is equally the duty of
passengers to use the means thus provided with reasonable circumspection and care: Del., Lack. & Western Railroad Co v. Napheys, 90
Penn. St.
If a passenger seated in a railroad car is injured by a collision, or by
a defect in any part of the machinery, aprimafrcie case of negligence
is established, and the onus of disproving it is cast upon the company:
Id.
Where the train has come to a stop, and a passenger, on stepping
from the lowest step of the platform of the cars to the ground, fractures
her knee-cap, without any apparent external cause, no presumption of
negligence is raised: Id.
NEW TRIAL. See Criminal Law.
Several Issues-Erroneousfindlng on Some-Rcfsal of Court to set
a.side.-Where, in an action involving several issues of fict, the finding
is in favor of the defendant on all the issues, when it should have been
in his favor on one only, it is error for the court, on motion therefor. to,
refuse to set aside the finding on the issues so erroneously determined.
where the effect of the judgment rendered on said issues is different
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from what it would have been if only rendered on the issue rightly
determined, and where said judgment may prove prejudicial to the
plaintiff: Union Central Life ins. Co. v. Satphin, 35 Ohio St.
When granted-Discretionof Court- What Evidence consideredCosts.-The mere fact that there was some evidence in pluintiff's Thvor,
so that the court could not properly order a compulsory nonsuit or direct
a verdict for the defendant, does not show that there was any abuse of
discretion in granting a new trial after a verdict in plaintiff's favor; and
this where defendant had offered no evidence: Jones v. . & N. IT
Railway Co., 49 Wis.
Evidence offered for the party in whose favor the verdict is rendered,
though improperly rejected, cannot be considered in determining the
propriety of granting a new trial : 11.
Where the verdict does not appear to be perverse, a new trial should
be granted only upon terms that the moving party pay the taxable costs
of the former trial: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.

Name of Andividnal Member-Signatureto Bill of Exchange-Labilit3 of Firm-Evidence.-Where a signature is common to an individual and a firm of which the individual is a member, a bona fide
holder for value, without notice whose paper it is, of a bill of exchange
with such signature attached, has not an option to sue either the individual or the firm. But there is a presumption that the bill was given
for the firm and is binding upon it, at least, where the individual carries on no business separate from the business of the firm of which he
is a member; this presumption, however, may be rebutted by proof
that the bill was signed, not in the name of the partnership but of the
individual for his private purpose, and it is immaterial that the bona
fide holder took the bill as the bill of the proprietors of the business
carried on by- the partnership, whoever they might be, and not merely
as the bill of the individual: Yorkshire Banking Co. v. Beatson, Law
Rep. 5 C. P. Div.
B. & M. carried on business in partnership. M. was a dormant partner, and B. was the only ostensible partner, the business being carried
on in his name alone. B. entered into accommodation transactions for
his private purposes, and without the authority of M. accepted and
endorsed bills of exchange, in his own name only. B., in becoming
party to these bills, did not intend to bind M., but he considered the
bills as private transactions and signed them merely on his own behalf.
The plaintiffs became bonafide holders for value of the bills signed by
B., and took the bills as the bills of the proprietors of the business
carried on by the partnership and not merely as the bills of B. Besides
the business of the partnership, B. was not engaged in any business.
Held, affirming the judgment of the Common Pleas Division, that the
plaintiffs could not hold M. liable upon the bills accepted and endorsed
by B.: Id.

PARTIES.

Legatees claiming by same Right.-Legatees named in a will, whose
legacies depend upon the same right and .vould be affected alike by the
judgment, may properly join as plaintiffs ; while the executors and the
legatees who controvert the plaintiff's right, should all be made defendants." Cal'in v. Wheeler, Ex'r, 49 Wis.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
PATENT.

Equivalents- Combination of old Elements-Prior Ue.-A patentee
of an invention, consisting merely of a combination of old ingredients,
is entitled to equivalents, and a party is an infringer who merely substitutes for one ingredient another which performs the same function
and was, at the date of the patent, well known to be adaptable to that
use: lmhaeuser v. Buerk, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
An infringement of such a patent cannot be justified, by proof that
each of the elements could be found separately in some prior patent,
printed publication or machine: Id.
PLEADING.

P.etition and Answer- General denial-Proofof Allegations not pecifically denied.-In a suit upon a policy of life insurance, the petitioner set forth the policy, the death of the insured and proper notice
to the company. The answer of the company, after a general denial
of all the allegations inthe petition tending to give a right of action,
averred special defences not including want of notice. Held, that plain.
tiff might recover without proof of such notice: Knickerbocker Life
Ins. Co. v. Schneider, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
RAILROAD.

See Common Carrier; Negligence.

Passenger- Ticket issued by one Company-Injury whilst travelling
by Train of another-Negligence-Liabilityof Carriers.-Thedefendants, a railway company, had running powers between ff., a station upon
their own line. and R.. a station of the S. company, over the line of that
company. The defendants and the S. company divided the profits of the
trafllc between H and R. The Dlaintiff took a return ticket from R. to
H., which was issued to him by'a clerk of the S. company. Upon the
return journey from H. to R. he travelled in a train belonging to the
defendants, and driven by their servants. Owing to the carriage being
unsuited to the platform at R., which belonged to the S. company, the
plaintiff sustained bodily injury At the trial the jury found that
the defendants had been guilty of negligence, field, that an action lay
against the defendants, for they, having permitted the plaintiff to trave:
by their train, were bound to make provision for his safety: .Foulkes v
Metropolitan District Railway Co., Law Rep., 5 C. P. Div.
Limiting Liability-ReasonableConditions -A condition that a rail
way company will not be liable, "in any case," for loss or damage to a
horse or dog, above certain specified values, delivered to them for carriage, unless the value is declared, is not just and reasonable withirr
sect. 7 of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, as it is in its terms
unconditional, and would, if valid, protect the company even in case
of the negligence or wilful misconduct of their servants. The case of
Harrison v. London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Co., 2 B. & S.
122. deciding that such a condition is reasonable, is overruled by Peek
v. North Staffordshire Railway Co., 10 H L. Cas. 473: Ashendon v.
London and Brighton Railway Co., Law Rep, 5 Exch. Div.
SHERIFF.

See Deed.

SHIPPING. See Insurance.
Wages-Set-off on account of Loss by Negligence of Claimant-Pa-
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ment by Underwriters.- In an action of wages by master against ship.
owner, the defendant, by way of set-off and counter claim, claimed
damages for the loss of the ship by the negligence of plaintiff. Reply
that the ship was insured against a total loss, and that the underwriters
had paid, or agreed to pay, to the owners the whole amount payable by
them on a total loss. Held, on demurrer, that the reply was bad,
because the plaintiff had not pleaded that the money had been actually
paid to the defendant, or that the counter claim had been brought without the authority of the underwriters: The Sir Charles Napier, Law
Rep., 5 Prob. Div.
Charter-party--.i'srecitalas to location of Vessel-Knowledge of
Parties.-A charter-party recited that at the date of its execution the
vessel was lying in the harbor of New Orleans. fiel, that this language
was not a warranty but a representation, and the fact that the vessel was
then at sea, if known to both parties, did not avoid the charter-party:
Lovell v. Davis, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
TAX. See ConstitutionalLaw.
Penaltyfor Non-payment-Not exacted for delay pending Controversy
with State as to !'tle-Injunction.-Where an owner's title to land is
disputed, both by the state and the United States, which set up adverse
claims to respective portions of the land, and the state, to save unnecessary trouble and expense, forbears to enforce the collection of taxes until
the title is adjusted, it cannot, after the owner's title has been estab.
lished, collect from him the extraordinary compensatior exacted by
statute for delay in paying taxes, but may be restrained by injunction
from collecting more than the arrears of taxes, with legal interest:
Litclhfield v. County of Webster, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
Illegal Assessmen-liunction-coporation-S"hares of Stoc.Where a board of equalization adds to the return of a tax-payer for
taxation an item of property not taxable, and directs the county auditor
to carry the amount so added on the duplicate, and assess against it
the rate of taxation fixed for state, county and city purposes, an injunction will lie to enjoin the auditor from so doing: Jones v. Davis, 35
Ohio St.
The personal property which a corporation, organized and doing
business under the laws of this state, was required to list for taxation,
by section 11 of the Act of May 11th 1878 (75 Ohio L. 436), embraced the capital stock of the corporation, and such being the case,
an owner of shares of the capital stock of such company was not
required to list his .shares for taxation: Id.
TRIAL.

Order of Argument-Discretion of Court-Appeal.-In the absence
of positive rules on the subject, the order of argument to the jury is
matter of practice within the control of the trial judge. and an appel.
late court will not interfere unless there has been a clear abuse of dis.
cretion, to the probable injury of the appellant: Kaime v. Trustees of
Village of Omro, 49 Wis.
UNITED STATES.

See Land.

